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Abstract
If decision costs lead agents to update consumption every D periods, then econometricians
will ﬁnd an anomalously low correlation between equity returns and consumption growth (Lynch
1996). We analytically characterize the dynamic properties of an economy composed of con-
sumers who have such delayed updating. In our setting, an econometrician using an Euler
equation procedure would infer a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion biased up by a factor of
6D. Hence with quarterly data, if agents adjust their consumption every D =4quarters, the
imputed coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion will be 24 times greater than the true value. High
levels of risk aversion implied by the equity premium and violations of the Hansen-Jagannathan
bounds cease to be puzzles. The neoclassical model with delayed adjustment explains the con-
sumption behavior of shareholders. Once limited participation is taken into account, the model
matches most properties of aggregate consumption and equity returns, including new evidence
that the covariance between ln(Ct+h/Ct) and Rt+1 slowly rises with h.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Consumption growth covaries only weakly with equity returns, which implies that equities are not
very risky. However, investors have historically received a very large premium for holding equities.
For twenty years, economists have asked why an asset with little apparent risk has such a large
required return.1
Grossman and Laroque (1990) argued that adjustment costs might answer the equity premium
puzzle. If it is costly to change consumption, households will not respond instantaneously to
changes in asset prices. Instead, consumption will adjust with a lag, explaining why consumption
growth covaries only weakly with current equity returns. In the Grossman and Laroque framework,
equities are risky, but that riskiness does not show up in a high contemporaneous correlation
between consumption growth and equity returns. The comovement is only observable in the
long-run.
Lynch (1996) and Marshall and Parekh (1999) have simulated discrete-time delayed adjustments
models and demonstrated that these models can potentially explain the equity premium puzzle.2
In light of the complexity of these models, both sets of authors used numerical simulations.
We propose a continuous-time generalization of Lynch’s (1996) model. Our extension provides
two new sets of results. First, our analysis is analytically tractable; we derive a complete ana-
lytic characterization of the model’s dynamic properties. Second, our continuous-time framework
generates eﬀe c t st h a ta r eu pt os i xt i m e sl a r g e rt h a nt h o s ei nd i s c r e t et i m em o d e l s .
We analyze an economy composed of consumers who update their consumption every D (as
in Delay) periods. Such delays may be motivated by decision costs, attention allocation costs,
and/or mental accounts.3 The core of the paper describes the consequences of such delays. In
addition, we derive a sensible value of D based on a decision cost framework.
The “6D bias” is our key result. Using data from our economy, an econometrician estimating
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) from the consumption Euler equation would generate
am u l t i p l i c a t i v eC R R Ab i a so f6D. For example, if agents adjust their consumption every D =4
quarters, and the econometrician uses quarterly aggregates in his analysis, the imputed coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion will be 24 times greater than the true value. Once we take account of
this 6D bias, the Euler equation tests are unable to reject the standard consumption model. High
equity returns and associated violations of the Hansen-Jagannathan (1991) bounds cease to be
puzzles.
The basic intuition for this result is quite simple. If households adjust their consumption
every D ≥ 1 periods, then on average only 1
D households will adjust each period. Consider only
the households that adjust during the current period and assume that these households adjust
consumption at dates spread uniformly over the period. Normalize the timing so the current
period is the time interval [0,1]. When a household adjusts at time i ∈ [0,1], it can only respond
to equity returns that have already been realized by time i. Hence, the household can only respond
to fraction i of within-period equity returns. Moreover, the household that adjusts at time i can
only change consumption for the remainder of the period. Hence, only fraction (1 − i) of this
1For the intellectual history of this puzzle, see Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978), Shiller (1982), Hansen and Single-
ton (1983), Mehra and Prescott (1985), and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). For useful reviews see Kocherlakota
(1996) and Campbell (2000).
2See also related work by Caballero (1995), He and Modest (1999), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Luttmer (1995),
and Lynch and Balduzzi (1999).
3See Gabaix and Laibson (2000b) for a discussion of decision costs and attention allocation costs. See Thaler
(1992) for a discussion of mental accounts.
2period’s consumption is aﬀected by the change at time i. On average the households that adjust
during the current period display a covariance between equity returns and consumption growth
that is biased down by factor Z 1
0




The integral is taken from 0 to 1 to average over the uniformly distributed adjustment times.
Since only fraction 1
D of households adjust in the ﬁrst place, the aggregate covariance between
equity returns and consumption growth is approximately 1
6· 1
D as large as it would be if all households
adjusted instantaneously. The Euler equation for the instantaneous adjustment model implies that
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is inversely related to the covariance between equity returns
a n dc o n s u m p t i o ng r o w t h . I fa ne c o n o m e t r i c i a nu s e dt h i sE u l e re q u a t i o nt oi m p u t et h ec o e ﬃcient
of relative risk aversion, and he used data from our delayed adjustment economy, he would impute
ac o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion that was 6D times too large.
In section 2 we describe our formal model, motivate our assumptions, and present our key
analytic ﬁnding. In section 2.2 we provide an heuristic proof of our results for the case D ≥ 1.
In section 3 we present additional results that characterize the dynamic properties of our model
economy. In section 4 we close our framework by describing how D is chosen. In section 5 we
consider the consequences of our model for macroeconomics and ﬁnance. In section 6 we discuss
empirical evidence that supports the Lynch (1996) model and our generalization. The model
matches most of the empirical moments of aggregate consumption and equity returns, including
an e wt e s tw h i c hc o n ﬁrms the 6D prediction that the covariance between ln(Ct+h/Ct) and Rt+1
should slowly rise with h. In section 7 we conclude.
2M o d e l a n d k e y r e s u l t
Our framework is a synthesis of ideas from the continuous-time model of Merton (1969) and the
discrete-time model of Lynch (1996). In essence we adopt Merton’s continuous-time modeling
approach and Lynch’s emphasis on delayed adjustment.4
We assume that the economy has two linear production technologies: a risk free technology
and a risky technology (i.e., equities). The risk free technology has instantaneous return r. The
returns from the risky technology follow a geometric diﬀusion process with expected return r + π
a n ds t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o nσ.
We assume that consumers hold two accounts: a checking account and a balanced mutual fund.
A consumer’s checking account is used for day to day consumption, and this account holds only
the risk free asset. The mutual fund is used to replenish the checking account from time to time.
The mutual fund is professionally managed and is continuously rebalanced so that θ share of the
mutual fund assets are always invested in the risky asset.5 The consumer is able to pick θ.6 In
practice, the consumer picks a mutual fund that maintains the consumer’s prefered value of θ. We
call θ the equity share (in the mutual fund).
Every D periods, the consumer looks at her mutual fund and decides how much wealth to
withdraw from the mutual fund to deposit in her checking account. Between withdrawal periods
– i.e., from withdrawal date t to the next withdrawal date t + D – the consumer spends from
4See Calvo (1983), Fischer (1977), and Taylor (1979) for earlier examples of delayed adjustment in macroeconomics.
5This assumption can be relaxed without signiﬁcantly changing the quantitative results. In particular, the
consumer could buy assets in separate accounts without any instantaneous rebalancing.
6The fact that θ does not vary once it is chosen is optimal from the perspective of the consumer in this model.
3her checking account and does not monitor her mutual fund. For now we take D to be exogenous.
Following a conceptual approach taken in Duﬃe and Sun (1990), we later calibrate D with a decision
cost model (see section 4). Alternatively, D can be motivated with a mental accounting model of
t h et y p ep r o p o s e db yT h a l e r( 1 9 9 2 ) .













Here i indexes the individual consumer and t indexes time.
We adopt the following notation. Let wit represent the wealth in the mutual fund at date t.
Between withdrawal dates, wit evolves according to
dwit = wit ((r + θπ)dt + θσdzt),
where zt is a Wiener process. We can now characterize the optimal choices of our consumer. We
describe each date at which the consumer monitors – and in equilibrium withdraws from – her
mutual fund as a “reset date.” Formal proofs of all results are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 On the equilibrium path, the following properties hold.
1. Between reset dates, consumption grows at a ﬁxed rate 1
γ(r − ρ).
2. The balance in the checking account just after a reset date equals the net present value of
consumption between reset dates, where the NPV is taken with the risk free rate.
3. At reset date τ, consumption is ciτ+ = αwiτ−, where α is a function of the technology para-
meters, preference parameters, and D.




Note that ciτ+ represents consumption immediately after reset and wiτ− represents wealth in
the mutual fund immediately before reset.
Claim 1 follows from the property that between reset dates the rate of return to marginal savings
is ﬁxed and equal to r. So between reset dates the consumption path grows at the rate derived in







Claim 2 reﬂects the advantages of holding wealth in the balanced mutual fund. Instantaneous
rebalancing of this fund makes it optimal to store ‘extra’ wealth – i.e., wealth that is not needed
for consumption between now and the next reset date – in the mutual fund. So the checking
account is exhausted between reset dates. Claim 3 follows from the homotheticity of preferences.
Claim 4 implies that the equity share is equal to the same equity share derived by Merton (1969)
in his instantaneous adjustment model. This exact equivalence is special to our institutional
assumptions, but approximate equivalence is a general property of models of delayed adjustment
4(see Rogers 2001 for numerical examples in a related model). Note that the equity share is
increasing in the equity premium (π) and decreasing in the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (γ)
and the variance of equity returns (σ2).
Combining claims 1-3 results implies that the optimal consumption path between date τ and
date τ + D is cit = αe
1
γ(r−ρ)(t−τ)wiτ− and the optimal balance in the checking account just after








Claim 3 implies that at reset dates optimal consumption is linear in wealth. The actual value
of the propensity to consume, α, does not matter for the results that follow. Any linear rule –
e.g., linear rules of thumb – will suﬃce. In practice, the optimal value of α in our model will be















Merton’s value is exactly optimal in our framework when D =0 .
2.1 Our key result: the 6D bias
In our economy, each agent resets consumption at intervals of D units of time. Agents are indexed
by their reset time i ∈ [0,D).A g e n t i resets consumption at dates {i,i + D,i +2 D,...}.
We assume that the consumption reset times are distributed uniformly.7 More formally, there
exists a continuum of consumers whose reset indexes i are distributed uniformly over [0,D). So the
proportion of agents resetting their consumption in any time interval of length ∆t ≤ D is ∆t/D.
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that the unit of time is a quarter of the calendar year, and D =4 .I n o t h e r
words, the span of time from t to t +1is one quarter of a year. Since D =4 , each consumer will
adjust her consumption once every four quarters. We will often choose the slightly non-intuitive
normalization that a quarter of the calendar year is one period, since quarterly data is the natural
unit of temporal aggregation with contemporary macroeconomic data.















is per-period consumption for consumer i.
Suppose that an econometrician estimates γ and β using a consumption Euler equation (i.e.,
the consumption CAPM). What will the econometrician infer about preferences?
Theorem 2 Consider an economy with true coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ.S u p p o s e a n












7The results change only a little when we relax the assumption of a uniform distribution. Most importantly, if
reset dates were clumped at the end of periods – a natural assumption – then the implied bias would be inﬁnite.
5for two assets, the risk free bond and the stock market. In other words, the econometrician ﬁts b β
and b γ to match the Euler equation above for both assets. Then the econometrician will ﬁnd
b γ =
(
6Dγ for D ≥ 1
6
3(1−D)+D2γ for 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 (2)
plus higher order terms characterized in subsequent sections.
Figure 1 plots b γ/γ as a function of D. The formulae for the cases 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 and D ≥ 1 are
taken from Theorem 2.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The two formulae paste at the crossover point, D =1 . Convexity of the formula below D =1 ,
implies that b γ/γ ≥ 6D for all values of D. The case of instantaneous adjustment (i.e., D =0 )
is of immediate interest since it has been solved already by Grossman, Melino, and Shiller (1987).
With D =0the only bias arises from time aggregation of the econometrician’s data, not delayed
adjustment by consumers. Grossman, Melino, and Shiller show that time aggregation produces a
bias of b γ/γ =2 , matching our formula for D =0 .
The most important result is the equation for D ≥ 1, b γ =6 Dγ,w h i c hw ec a l lt h e6D bias. For
example, if each period (t to t +1 ) is a quarter of a calendar year, and consumption is reset every
D =4quarters, then we get b γ =2 4 γ. Hence γ is overestimated by a factor of 24. If consumption
is revised every 5 years then we have D =2 0 ,a n db γ =1 2 0 γ.
Reset periods of four quarters or more are not unreasonable in practice. For an extreme
case, consider the 30-year-old employee who accumulates balances in a retirement savings account
(e.g., a 401(k)) and fails to recognize any fungibility between these assets and his pre-retirement
consumption. In this case, stock market returns will eﬀect consumption at a considerable lag
(D>120 quarters for this example).
However, such extreme cases are not necessary for the points that we wish to make. Even
with a delay of only four quarters, the implications for the equity premium puzzle literature are
dramatic. With a multiplicative bias of 24, econometrically imputed coeﬃcients of relative risk
aversion of 50 suddenly appear quite reasonable, since they imply actual coeﬃcients of relative risk
aversion of roughly 2.
In addition, our results do not rely on the strong assumption that all reset rules are time- and
not state-contingent. In Appendix B we incorporate the realistic assumption that all households
adjust immediately when the equity market experiences a large (Poisson) shock. In practice, such
occassional state-contingent adjustments only slightly modify our results.
We can also compare the 6D bias analytically to the biases that Lynch (1996) numerically
simulates in his original discrete time model. In Lynch’s framework, agents consume every month
and adjust their portfolio every T months. Lynch’s econometric observation period is the union
of F one-month intervals, so D = T/F. In Appendix C we show that when D ≥ 1 Lynch’s
framework generates a bias which is bounded below by D and bounded above by 6D. Speciﬁcally,
an econometrician who naively estimated the Euler equation with data from Lynch’s economy





(F +1 )( F +2 )
+ higher order terms. (3)
6Holding D constant, the continuous time limit corresponds to F →∞ , and for this case b γ/γ =6 D.
T h ed i s c r e t et i m ec a s ew h e r ea g e n t sc o n s u m ea te v e r ye c o n o m e t r i cp e r i o dc o r r e s p o n d st oF =1 ,
implying b γ/γ = D, which can be derived directly.
Finally, the 6D bias complements participation bias (e.g., Vissing 2000, Brav et al 2000). If
only a fraction s of agents hold a signiﬁcant share of their wealth in equities (say s = 1
3), then
the covariance between aggregate consumption and returns is lower by a factor s.A s T h e o r e m
8 demonstrates, this bias combines multiplicatively with our bias: if there is limited participation,






This formula puts together three important biases generated by Euler equation (and Hansen-
Jagannathan) tests: b γ will be overestimated because of time aggregation and delayed adjustment
(the 6D factor), and because of limited participation (the 1/s factor).
2.2 Argument for D ≥ 1
In this section we present a heuristic proof of Theorem 2. A rigorous proof is provided in the
appendix.
Normalize a generic period to be one unit of time. The econometrician observes the return of
the stock market from 0 to 1:







where r is the risk-free interest rate, π is the equity premium, σ2 is the variance of stock returns, and











As is well-known, when returns and consumption are assumed to be jointly log normal, the standard








We will show that when D ≥ 1 the measured covariance between consumption growth and
















a/2+σaεa. The a subscripts and superscripts denote asset-speciﬁc
returns and standard deviations. As Hansen and Singleton (1983) showed,













− b γσac =0 .
If we evaluate this expression for the risk-free asset and equities, we ﬁnd that,








Note that π + r = µa.






Assume that each agent consumes one unit in period [−1,0].9 So aggregate consumption in


















0 cisds the time-aggregated consumption of agent i during period [0,1].
First, take the case D =1 .A g e n t i ∈ [0,1) changes her consumption at time i.F o rs ∈ [0,i),
she has consumption cis = αwiτ−e
1
γ (r−ρ)(s−τ), where τ = i − D.
Throughout this paper we use approximations to get analytic results. Let ε ≡ max(r,ρ,θπ,σ2,σ2θ2,α).
When we use annual periods ε will be approximately .05.10 For quarterly periods, ε will be ap-
proximately .01. We can express our approximation errors in higher order terms of ε.
Since consumption in period [−1,0] is normalized to one, at time τ = i − D, α times wealth
will be equal to 1, plus small corrective terms; more formally:
αwiτ− =1 + O<0(
√
ε)+O(ε)
αwiτ+ =1 + O<0(
√
ε)+O(ε).
Here O(ε) represents stochastic or deterministic terms of order ε,a n dO<0(
√
ε) represents stochastic
terms that depend only on equity innovations that happen before time 0. Hence these stochastic
O<0(
√
ε) terms are all orthogonal to equity innovations during period [0,1].





























































































' θσ2i(1 − i)
Here and below ' means “plus higher order terms in ε.”
The covariance contains the multiplicative factor i because the consumption change reﬂects
only return information which is revealed between date 0 and date i. The covariance contains the
multiplicative factor (1 − i) because the change in consumption occurs at time i, and therefore
aﬀects consumption for only the subinterval [i,1].
We often analyze “normalized” variances and covariances. Speciﬁcally, we divide the moments
predicted by the 6D model by the moments predicted by the benchmark model with instantaneous
adjustment and instantaneous measurement. Such normalizations highlight the “biases” introduced
by the 6D economy.













i(1 − i)di =
1
6
which is the (inverse of the) 6D factor for D =1 .
Consider now the case D ≥ 1.C o n s u m e r i ∈ [0,D) resets her consumption at t = i.D u r i n g
period one (i.e., t ∈ [0,1])o n l ya g e n t sw i t hi ∈ [0,1] will reset their consumption. Consumers with
i ∈ (1,D] will not change their consumption, so they will have a zero covariance, cov(Ci1,R 1)=0 .
Hence,
1
θσ2cov (Ci1,R 1) '
½
i(1 − i) if i ∈ [0,1]
0 if i ∈ [1,D]


























9The 6D lower covariance of consumption with returns translates into a 6D higher measured
CRRA b γ. Since θ = π





The Euler equation (6) then implies
b γ =6 Dγ
as anticipated.
Several properties of our result should be emphasized. First, holding D ﬁxed, the bias in b γ does
not depend on either preferences or technology: r, π,σ,ρ,γ. This independence property will apply
to all of the additional results that we report in subsequent sections. When D is endogenously
derived, D itself will depend on the preference and technology parameters.
For simplicity, the derivation above assumes that agents with diﬀerent adjustment indexes i have
the same “baseline” wealth at the start of each period. In the long-run this wealth equivalence
will not apply exactly. However, if the wealth disparity is moderate, the reasoning above will still
hold approximately.11 Numerical analysis with 50-year adult lives implies that the actual bias is
very close to 6D, the value it would have if all of the wealth levels were identical period-by-period.
3 General characterization of the economy
In this section we provide a general characterization of the dynamic properties of the economy
described above. We analyze four properties of our economy: excess smoothness of consumption
growth, positive autocorrelation of consumption growth, low covariance of consumption growth and
asset returns, and non-zero covariance of consumption growth and lagged equity returns.
Our analysis focuses on ﬁrst-order eﬀects with respect to the parameters r, ρ, θπ, σ2, σ2θ2, and
α.C a l lε ≡ max(r, ρ,θπ,σ2,σ2θ2,α).W ea s s u m eε to be small. Empirically, ε ' .05 with a period
length of a year, and ε ' .01 with a period length of a calendar quarter. All the results that follow
(except one12)a r ep r o v e dw i t hO(ε3/2) residuals. In fact, at the cost of more tedious calculations,
one can show that the residuals are actually O(ε2).13
The following theorem is the basis of this section. All proofs appear in the appendix.


















D2 [d(D + h)+d(D − h) − d(h) − d(−h)], (10)
11More precisely, it is only important that the average wealth of households that switch on date t not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from the average wealth of households that switch on any date s ∈ [t − D,t + D].T o g u a r a n t e e t h i s
cross-date average similarity we could assume that each reset interval ends stochastically. This randomness generates
“mixing” between populations of households that begin life with diﬀerent reset dates.
12Equation 12 is proved to order O(
√
ε), but with more tedious calculations can be shown to be O(ε).
13One follows exactly the lines of the proofs presented here, but includes higher order terms. Calculations are

















i!(4−i)! is the binomial coeﬃcient.
The expressions above are valid for non-integer values of D and h. Functions d(D) and Γ(D,h)
have the following properties, many of which will be exploited in the analysis that follows14.
• d ∈ C4
• d(D)=|D|/2 for |D| ≥ 2
• d(0) = 7/30
• Γ(D,h) ∼ 1/D for large D
• Γ(D,h) ≥ 0
• Γ(D,h) > 0 iﬀ D +2>h
• Γ(D,h) is nonincreasing in h
• Γ(D,0) is decreasing in D,b u tΓ(D,h) is hump-shaped for h>0.
• Γ(0,h)=0for h ≥ 2
• Γ(0,0) = 2/3
• Γ(0,1) = 1/6
Figure 2 plots d(D) along with a second function which we will use below.
Insert Figure 2 about here
3.1 Γ(D,0)
We begin by studying the implications of the autocovariance function, Γ(D,h), for the volatility
of consumption growth (i.e, by setting h =0 ) . Like Caballero (1995), we also show that delayed
adjustment induces excess smoothness. Corollary 4 describes our quantitative result.
Corollary 4 In the frictionless economy (D =0 ) , var(dCt/Ct)/dt = σ2θ2.I no u re c o n o m y ,w i t h
delayed adjustment and time aggregation bias,
var(lnCt/Ct−1)
σ2θ2 = Γ(D,0) ≤ 2/3.
The volatility of consumption, σ2θ2Γ(D,0), decreases as D increases.
The normalized variance of consumption, Γ(D,0), is plotted against D in Figure 3.
14Γ is continuous, so Γ(0,h) is intended as limD→0 Γ(D,h).
11Insert Figure 3 about here.
For D =0 , the normalized variance is 2/3, well below the benchmark value of 1. The D =0case
reﬂects the bias generated by time aggregation eﬀects. As D rises above zero, delayed adjustment
eﬀects also appear. For D =0 ,1,2,4,20 the normalized variance takes values .67, .55, .38, .22,
and .04. For large D, the bias is approximately 1/D.
Intuitively, as D increases, none of the short-run volatility of the economy is reﬂe c t e di nc o n -
sumption growth, since only 1/D proportion of the agents adjust consumption in any single period.
Moreover, the size of the adjustments only grows with
√
D. So the total magnitude of adjustment
is falling with 1/
√
D and the variance falls with 1/D.
3.2 Γ(D,h) with h>0
We now consider the properties of the (normalized) autocovariance function Γ(D,h) for h =
1,2,4,8. Figure 4 plots these respective curves, ordered from h =1on top to h =8at the
bottom. Note that in the benchmark case – instantaneous adjustment and no time-aggregation
bias – the autocovariation of consumption growth is zero. With only time aggregation eﬀects, the
one-period autocovariance is Γ(0,1) = 1/6, and all h−period autocovariances with h>1 are zero.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
3.3 Revisiting the equity premium puzzle
We can also state a formal and more general analogue of Theorem 2.
Proposition 5 Suppose that consumers reset their consumption every ha periods. Then the co-








where, D = ha/h, and
b(D)=
(
6D for D ≥ 1
6
3(1−D)+D2 for 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 .








In the benchmark model with continuous sampling/adjustment, the covariance is just
cov(dlnCt,dlnRt)/dt = θσ2.
Moreoever, in the benchmark model with continuous sampling/adjustment, the covariance at hori-
zon h is just
cov(lnC[t,t+h]/C[t−h,t],lnR[t,t+h])=θσ2h.
So the eﬀect introduced by the 6D model is captured by the factor 1
b(D), which appears in Propo-
sition 5.
12We compare this benchmark to the eﬀects generated by our discrete observation, delayed ad-
justment model. As the horizon h tends to +∞, the normalized covariance between consumption














which is true for any ﬁxed value of ha. This eﬀect is due exclusively to time aggregation. Delayed
adjustment ceases to matter as the horizon length goes to inﬁnity.
Proposition 5 covers the special case discussed in section two: horizon h =1 ,a n dr e s e tp e r i o d








Figure 5 plots the multiplicative covariance bias factor 1/b(ha/h) as a function of h,f o rha =1 .
In the benchmark case (i.e., continuous sampling and instantaneous adjustment) there is no bias;
the bias factor is unity. In the case with only time aggregation eﬀects (i.e., discrete sampling and
ha =0 )the bias factor is 1/b(0/h)=1 /2.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
Hence, low levels of comovement show up most sharply when horizons are low. For D ≥ 1 (i.e.,
ha/h ≥ 1), the covariance between consumption growth and stock returns is 6D times lower than
one would expect in the model with continuous adjustment and continuous sampling.
We now characterize covariance between current consumption growth and lagged equity returns.
Theorem 6 Suppose that consumers reset their consumption every ha = Dh periods. Then the
covariance between lnC[t,t+1]/C[t−1,t] and lagged equity returns lnR[t+s1,t+s2] (s1 <s 2 ≤ 1)w i l lb e
cov(lnC[t,t+1]/C[t−1,t],lnR[t+s1,t+s2])=θσ2V (D,s1,s 2)+O(ε3/2) (13)
with
V (D,s1,s 2)=







6 for |x| ≤ 1
3|x|−1
6 for |x| ≥ 1
. (15)
The following corollary will be used in the empirical section.









= θσ2e(1 + D) − e(1) − e(1 − h + D)+e(1 − h)
D
+O(ε3/2). (16)
In particular, when h ≥ D +2 ,c o v (lnC[s+h−1,s+h]/C[s−1,s],lnR[s,s+1])=θσ2; one sees full adjust-
ment at horizons (weakly) greater than D +2 .
13In practice, Theorem 6 is most naturally applied when the lagged equity returns correspond to
speciﬁc lagged time periods: i.e., s2 = s1 +1 , s1 =0 ,−1,−2,....
Note that V (D,s1,s 2) > 0 iﬀ s2 > −D − 1. Hence, the covariance in Theorem 6 is positive
only at lags 0 through D +1 .
Figure 6 plots the normalized covariances of consumption growth and lagged asset returns for
diﬀerent values of D.S p e c i ﬁcally, we plot V (D,s,s +1 )against s for D = .25,1,2,4, from right
to left.
Insert Figure 6 about here.






βs = θV (D,s,s +1 ) .








V (D,s,s+1 )=1 .
This implies that the sum of the coeﬃcients will equal the portfolio share of the stock market,15
0 X
s=−D−1
βs = θ. (17)
3.4 Extension to multiple assets and heterogeneity in D.
We now extend the framework to the empirically relevant case of multiple assets with stochastic
returns. We also introduce heterogeneity in D’s. Such heterogeneity may arise because diﬀerent
D’s apply to diﬀerent asset classes and because D may vary across consumers.
Say that there are diﬀerent types of consumers l =1 ,...,nl and diﬀerent types of asset accounts
m =1 ...nm. Consumers of type l exist in proportion pl (
P
l pl =1 ) and look at account m every
Dlm periods. The consumer has wealth wlm invested in account m, and has an associated marginal
propensity to consume (MPC), αlm. In most models the MPC’s will be the same for all assets,
but for the sake of behavioral realism and generality we consider possibly diﬀerent MPC’s.
For instance, income shocks could have a low D =1 , stock market shocks a higher D =4 ,
and shocks to housing wealth a D =4 0 .16 Account m has standard deviation σm, and shocks
dzm
t . Call ρmn = cov(dznt,dz mt)/dt the correlation matrix of the shocks and σmn = ρmnσmσn their
covariance matrix.
15This is true in a world with only equities and riskless bonds. In general, it’s more appropriate to use a model
w i t hs e v e r a la s s e t s ,i n c l u d i n gh u m a nc a p i t a l ,a si nt h en e x ts e c t i o n .
16This example implies diﬀerent short-run marginal propensities to consume out of wealth windfalls in diﬀerent
asset classes. Thaler (1992) describes one behavioral model with similar asset-speciﬁc marginal propensities to
consume.
14T o t a lw e a l t hi nt h ee c o n o m yi s
P
l,mplwlm and total consumption
P






As h o c kdzmt in wealth account m will get translated at mean interval 1
2
P
l plDlm into a consump-
tion shock dC/C =
P
l θlmdzmt.
We can calculate the second moments of our economy.
























d(D + h)+d(D0 − h) − d(D0 − D − h) − d(h)
¤
(21)
and V deﬁned in (14), d deﬁned in (11).
The function Γ(D,t), deﬁned earlier in (10), relates to Γ(D,D0,t) by Γ(D,D,t)=Γ(D,t).
Recall that V (D,0,1) = 1/b(D). So a conclusion from (19) is that, when there are several types
of people and assets, the bias that the econometrician would ﬁn di st h eh a r m o n i cm e a no ft h e
individual biases b(Dlm), the weights being given by the “shares of variance.”
As an application, consider the case with identical agents (nl =1 , l is suppressed for this
example) and diﬀerent assets with the same MPC, αm = α.R e c a l lt h a tV (D,0,1) = 1/b(D).S o ,
















Hence, with several assets, the aggregate bias is the weight mean of the biases, the mean being the
harmonic mean, and the weight of asset m being the share of the total variance that comes from
this asset. T h i sa l l o w su s ,i nA p p e n d i xB ,t od i s c u s sam o d i ﬁcation of the model with diﬀerential
attention to big shocks (jumps).
T h e s er e l a t i o n s h i p sa r ed e r i v e de x a c t l ya l o n gt h el i n e so ft h es i n g l ea s s e t ,s i n g l et y p ee c o n -
omy of the previous sections. Expression (19) is the covariance between returns, lnRn
[t+s1,t+s2] =
σnzn








[t−1+i−Dm,t−1+i]di + O(ε3/2), (23)
where a(i)=( 1 − |i|)
+ . Equation (23) can also be used to calculate the autocovariance (20) of











The closed form expression (21) of Γ is derived in the appendix.
153.5 Sketch of the proof
Proofs of the propositions appear in the appendix. In this subsection we provide intuition for those
arguments. We start with the following representation formula for consumption growth.







di + O(ε). (25)





























































The bulk of the proof is devoted to the explicit calculation of this last equation and equation (27).
4 Endogenizing D
Until now, we have assumed that D is ﬁxed exogenously. In this section we discuss how D is
chosen, and provide a framework for calibrating D.
Because of delayed adjustment, the actual consumption path will deviate from the “ﬁrst-best”
instantaneously-adjusted consumption path. In steady-state, the welfare loss associated with this









+ higher order terms. (28)
Here ∆C is the diﬀerence between actual consumption and ﬁrst-best instantaneously adjusted








17This is a second-order approximation. See Cochrane (1989) for a similar derivation.
16Equations (28) and (29) are derived in the appendix. We assume18 that each consumption ad-
justment costs q proportion of wealth, w. A sensible calibration of q would be qw =( 1 % ) ( annual
consumption) =( .01)(.04)w =( 4· 10−4)w.
The NPV of costs as a fraction of current wealth is q
P





The optimal D minimizes both consumption variability costs and cognitive costs, i.e. D∗ =
argminΛc + Λq.



































when ρ D ¿ 1.
We make the following calibration choices: q =4·10−4, σ2 =( 0 .16)2, γ =3 , ρ =0 .01, π =0 .06,
and θ = π/(γσ2)=0 .78. Substituting into our equation for D,w eﬁnd
D ' 2 years.
This calibration implies that D values of at least 1 year (or 4 quarters) are quite easy to defend.
Moreover, our formula for D∗ is highly sensitive to the value of θ. If a liquidity constrained consumer
has only a small fraction of her wealth in equities – because most of her wealth is in other forms
like human capital or home equity – then the value of D will be quite large. If θ = .05 because
of liquidity constraints, then D∗ ' 30 years.
Note that formula (30) would work for other types of shocks than stock market shocks. With

































if the adjustment to consumption are made at dates (τi)i≥0. A session of consumption planning at time t lowers
utility by a consumption equivalent of qe
−ρt.
17with qmwm representing the cost of evaluating asset m, and θm generalized as in equation (18).
Equation (31) implies sensible comparative statics on the frequency of reappraisal. Thus we get a
mini-theory of the allocation of attention across accounts.19
5 Consequences for macroeconomics and ﬁnance
5.1 Simple calibrated macro model
To draw together the most important implications of this paper, we describe a simple model of the
US economy. We use our model to predict the variability of consumption growth, the autocorre-
lation of consumption growth, and the covariance of consumption growth with equity returns.
Assume the economy is comprised of two classes of consumers: stockholders and non-stockholders.20
The consumers that we model in section 2 are stockholders. Non-stockholders do not have any
equity holdings, and instead consume earnings from human capital. Stockholders have aggregate
wealth St and non-stockholders have aggregate wealth Nt. Total consumption is given by the
weighted sum
Ct = α(St + Nt).
Recall that α is the marginal propensity to consume.
So, consumption growth can be decomposed into
dC/C = sdS/S + ndN/N.
Here s represents the wealth of shareholders divided by the total wealth of the economy and n =1 −s
represents the wealth of non-shareholders divided by the total wealth of the economy. So s and
n are wealth shares for shareholders and non-shareholders respectively. We make the simplifying
approximation that s and n are constant in the empirically relevant medium-run.
Using a ﬁrst-order approximation,
ln(Ct/Ct−1)=sln(St/St−1)+nln(Nt/Nt−1).
If stockholders have loading in stocks θ, the ratio of stock wealth to total wealth in the economy
is,
Θ = sθ. (32)
To calibrate the economy we begin with the observation that human capital claims about 2/3
of GDP, Y . In this model, human capital is the discounted net present value of labor income
accruing to the current cohort of non-stockholders. We assume that the expected duration of
the remaining working life of a typical worker is 30 years, implying that the human capital of the










19See Gabaix and Laibson (2000a,b) for a broader theoretical and empirical analysis of attention allocation.
20This is at a given point in time. A major reason for non-participation is that relatively young agents have most of
their wealth in human capital, against which they cannot borrow to invest in equities (see Constantinides, Donaldson
and Mehra 2000).
18where Y is aggregate income. Capital income claims 1/3 of GDP. Assuming that it has the riskiness










By assuming that all capital is identical to stock market capital, we implicitly increase the pre-
dicted covariance between stock returns and consumption growth. A more realistic model would
assume a more heterogeneous capital stock, and hence a lower covariance between stock returns
and consumption growth.
In this model economy, we work with data at the quarterly frequency. We assume σ = .16/
√
4,
π = .06/4, r = .01/4, and γ =3 , so the equity share (equation (1) above) is θ = π/(γσ2)=.78.
Then equation (32) implies s = .28. In other words, 28% of the wealth in this economy is owned
by shareholders. All of stockholders’ claims are in either stock or risk-free bonds. To keep things
simple, we counterfactually assume that N and S are uncorrelated.
We have to take a stand on the distribution of D0s in the economy. We assume that D values
are uniformly distributed from 0 to D =1 2 0quarters (i.e., 30 years). We adopt this distribution
to capture a wide range of investment styles. Extremely active investors will have a D value close
to 0, while passive savers may put their retirement wealth in a special mental account, eﬀectively
ignoring the accumulating wealth until after age 65 (Thaler 1992). We are agnostic about the true
distribution of D types, and we present this example for illustrative purposes. Any wide range of
D values would serve to make our key points.
To keep the focus on stockholders, we assume that non-stockholders adjust their consumption
instantaneously in response to innovations in labor income – i.e., at intervals of length 0.










We assume that the quarterly standard deviation of growth in human capital is σN = .01.21 Our
assumptions jointly imply that σC = .0063.22 Most of this volatility comes from variation in the
consumption of non-stockholders. Stockholders generate relatively little consumption volatility
because they represent a relatively small share of total consumption and because they only adjust
consumption every D periods. This adjustment rule smooths out the response to wealth innova-
tions, since only fraction 1
D of stockholders adjust their consumption during any single period and
the average adjustment is of magnitude
√
D.
Our model’s implied quarterly consumption volatility – σC =0 .0063 –l i e sb e l o wi t se m p i r i -
cal counterpart. We calculate the empirical σC using the cross-country panel dataset created by
21We calibrate σN from post-War U.S. data on wage growth. From 1959-2000 the standard deviation of per-capita
real wage growth at the quarterly frequency has been .0097 (National Income and Product Accounts, Commerce
Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis). If wages follow a random walk, then the standard deviation of growth
in human capital, σN , will equal the standard deviation in wage growth.














2 =0 .049 · 10
−4.
19Campbell (1999).23 We estimate σC =0 .0106 by averaging across all of the countries in Campbell’s
dataset: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, and U.S.24 Part of the gap between our theoretical standard deviation
and the empirical standard deviation may reﬂect measurement error, which should systematically
raise the standard deviation of the empirical data. In addition, most of the empirical consumption
series include durables, which should raise the variability of consumption growth (Mankiw 1982).
By contrast, the US consumption data omits durables and for the US we calculate σC =0 .0054,
closely matching our theoretical value.
















Using our calibration choices, our model implies ρC =0 .34.25 This theoretical prediction lies well
above the empirical estimate of −0.11, found by averaging across the country-by-country autocor-
relations in the Campbell dataset. Here too, both measurement error and the inclusion of durables
are likely to bias the empirical correlations down. Again, the US data, which omits durables,
comes much closer to matching our theoretical prediction. In the US data, ρC =0 .22.








=0 .13 · 10−4
assuming that in the short-run the consumption growth of non-stockholders is uncorrelated with
the consumption growth of stockholders. The covariance estimate of 0.13 · 10−4 almost matches
the average covariance in the Campbell dataset, 0.14·10−4. This time, however, the U.S. data does
not “outperform” the rest of the countries in the Campbell dataset. For the U.S., the covariance
is 0.60 · 10−4. However, all of these covariances come much closer to matching our model than
to matching the benchmark model with instantaneous adjustment/measurement. The benchmark
model with no delayed adjustment predicts that the quarterly covariance will be θσ2 ' 50 · 10−4.
What would an econometrician familiar with the consumption-CAPM literature conclude if
he observed quarterly data from our 6D economy, but thought he were observing data from the





and conclude that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is over one-thousand. If he were familiar






23We thank John Campbell for sharing this dataset with us.
24We use quarterly data from the Campbell dataset. The quarterly data begins in 1947 for the US, and begins
close to 1970 for most of the other countries. The dataset ends in 1996.
25T h er e s p e c t i v ee ﬀects are n
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2 = .048 · 10
−4.
20Finally, if he read Mankiw and Zeldes carefully, he would realize that he should also do a continuous
time adjustment (of the type suggested by Grossman et al 1987), leading to another halving of his
estimate. But, after all of this hard work, he would still end up with a biased coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion: 300/2 = 150. For this economy, the true coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is 3!
These observations suggest that the literature on the equity premium puzzle should be reap-
praised. Once one takes account of delayed adjustment, high estimates of γ no longer seem anom-
alous. If workers in mid-life take decades to respond to innovations in their retirement accounts,
we should expect naive estimates of γ that are far too high.
Defenders of the Euler equation approach might argue that economists can go ahead estimating
the value of γ and simply correct those estimates for the biases introduced by delayed adjustment.
However, we do not view this as a fruitful approach, since the adjustment delays are diﬃcult to
observe or calibrate.
For an active stock trader, knowledge of personal ﬁnancial wealth may be updated daily, and
consumption may adjust equally quickly. By contrast, for the typical employee who invests in a
401(k) plan, retirement wealth may be in its own mental account,26 and hence may not be integrated
into current consumption decisions. This generates lags of decades or more between stock price
changes and consumption responses. Without precise knowledge of the distribution of D values,
econometricians will be hard pressed to accurately measure γ using the Euler equation approach.
In summary, our model tells us that high imputed γ values are not anomalous and that high
frequency properties of the aggregate data can be explained by a model with delayed adjustment.
Hence, the equity premium may not be a puzzle.
Finally, we wish to note that our delayed adjustment model is complementary to the theoretical
work of other authors who have analyzed the equity premium puzzle.27 Our qualitative approach
has some similarity with the habit formation approach (e.g., Constantinides 1990, Abel 1990,
Campbell and Cochrane 1999). Habit formation models imply that slow adjustment is optimal
because households prefer to smooth the growth rate (not the level) of consumption. In our 6D
model, slow adjustment is only optimal because decision costs make high frequency adjustment too
expensive.
6 Review of related empirical evidence
In this section, we review two types of evidence that lend support to our model. In this ﬁrst
subsection we review survey evidence which suggests that investors know relatively little about
high frequency variation in their equity wealth. In the second subsection we show that equity
innovations predict future consumption growth.
6.1 Knowledge of equity prices
Consumers can’t respond to high frequency innovations in equity values if they don’t keep close
tabs on the values of their equity portfolios. In this subsection, we discuss survey evidence that
suggests that consumers may know relatively little about high frequency variation in the value of
their equity wealth.28 We also discuss related evidence that suggests that consumers may not
26See Thaler (1992).
27For other proposed solutions to the equity premium puzzle see Kocherlakota (1996), Bernartzi and Thaler (1995),
and Barberis et al (2000).
28We are grateful to Karen Dynan for pointing out much of this evidence to us.
21adjust consumption in response to business cycle frequency variation in their equity holdings. All
of this evidence is merely suggestive, since survey responses may be unreliable.
The 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) was conducted during the last six months of
1998, a period of substantial variation in equity prices. In July the average value of the Wilshire
5000 equity index was 10,770. The index dropped to an average value of 9,270 in September,
before rising back to an average value of 10,840 in December. Kennickell et al (2000) analyze the
1998 SCF data to see whether self-reported equity wealth covaries with movements in stock market
indexes. Kennickell et al ﬁnd that the SCF equity measures are uncorrelated with the value of the
Wilshire index on the respondents’ respective interview dates. Only respondents that were active
stock traders (≥12 trades/year) showed a signiﬁcant correlation between equity holdings and the
value of the Wilshire index.
Dynan and Maki (2000) report related results. They analyze the responses to the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the ﬁrst quarter of 1996 to the ﬁrst quarter of 1999. During this
period, the U.S. equity markets rose over 15% during almost every 12 month period. Nevertheless,
when respondents were surveyed for the CEX, one third of stockholders reported no change in the
value of their securities during the 12 month period before their respective interviews.29
Starr-McCluer (2000) analyzes data from the Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC) collected
in the summer of 1997. One of the survey questions asked, “Have you [Has your family] changed
the amount you spend or save as a result of the trend in stock prices during the past few years?”
Among all stockholder respondents, 85.0% said “no eﬀect.” Among stockholder respondents with
most of their stock outside retirement accounts, 83.3% said “no eﬀect.” Even among stockholders
with large portfolios (≥ $250,000), 78.4% said “no eﬀect.”
6.2 The eﬀect of lagged equity returns on consumption growth
Dynan and Maki (2000) analyze household level data on consumption growth from the CEX, and
ask whether lagged stock returns aﬀect future consumption growth. They break their results down
for non-stockholders and stockholders. For stockholders with at least $10,000 in securities a 1%
innovation in the value of equity holdings generates a 1.03% increase in consumption of nondurables
and services. However, this increase in consumption occurs with a lag. One third of the increase
occurs during the ﬁrst nine-months after the equity price innovation. Another third occurs 10 to
18 months after the price innovation. Another quarter of the increase occurs 19 to 27 months after
the price innovation and the rest of the increase occurs 28 to 36 months after the price innovation.
We now turn to evidence from aggregate data. We look for a relationship between equity
returns and future consumption growth. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1) for
h =1 ,2,...,25.
Under the null hypothesis of D =0 , the quarterly covariance between equity returns and










29For the purposes of this survey a change in the value of equity securities includes changes due to price appreciation,
sales, and/or purchases.
22The eﬀects of time aggregation bias are incorporated into this prediction. An equity innovation
during period t +1only aﬀects consumption after the occurrence of the equity innovation. So
the predicted covariance, Cov(ln[Ct+1/Ct],lnRt+1), is half as great as it would be if consumption
growth were measured instantaneously.
This time-aggregation bias vanishes once we extend the consumption growth horizon to two or






Hence the D =0assumption implies that the proﬁle of Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1) for h ≥ 2 should
be ﬂat.
Figure 7 plots the empirical values of Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1), for h ∈ {1,2,...,25}.30 We
use the cross-country panel dataset created by Campbell (1999).31 Figure 7 plots the value of
Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1), averaging across all of the countries in Campbell’s dataset: Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, and USA.32 Figure 7 also plots the average value of Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1), averaging
across all of the countries with large stock markets. Speciﬁcally, we ordered the countries in the
Campbell dataset by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in 1993. The top half of the
countries were included in our “large stock market” subsample: Switzerland (.87), United Kingdom
(.80), USA (.72), Netherlands (.46), Australia (.42), and Japan (.40).
Insert Figure 7 about here.
Two properties of the empirical covariances stand out. First, the empirical covariances slowly
rise as the consumption growth horizon, h, increases. Contrast this slow increase with the coun-
terfactual prediction for the D =0case that the covariance should plateau at h =2 . Second,
the empirical covariances are much lower than the covariance predicted by the D =0case. For
example, at a horizon of 4 quarters, the average empirical covariance is roughly .0002, far smaller
than the theoretical prediction of .0014.
F i g u r e7a l s op l o t st h ep r e d i c t e d 33 covariance proﬁle implied by the 6D model.34 To generate
this prediction we assume that D values are uniformly distributed from 0 years to 30 years, as
discussed in the previous section.
30See Hall (1978) for early evidence that lagged stock returns predict future consumption growth. See Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001) for a VAR approach that implies that lagged stock returns do not predict future consumption
growth. Future work should attempt to reconcile our results with those of Lettau and Ludvigson.
31We thank John Campbell for giving this dataset to us.
32Speciﬁcally, we calculate Cov(lnRt+1,ln[Ct+h/Ct]) for each country and each h-quarter horizon, h ∈ {1,2,...,25}.
We then average across all of the countries in the sample. We use quarterly data from the Campbell dataset. The











34The following approximation for the covariances provides intuition for the orders of magnitude. In normalized
units,
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23The 6D model predicts that the covariance, Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1), slowly rises with the
horizon h. To understand this eﬀect, recall that the 6D economy slowly adjusts to innovations in
the value of equity holdings. Some consumers respond quickly to equity innovations, either because
these consumers have low D values, or because they have a high D value and are coincidentally
coming up to a reset period. Other consumers respond with substantial lags. For our illustrative
example, the full response will take 30 years. For low h values, the 6D model predicts that the
covariance proﬁle will be close to zero. As h goes to inﬁnity, the covariance proﬁle asymptotes
to the prediction of the instantaneous adjustment model, so limh→∞ Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1)=
Θσ2 = .0014. Figure 7 shows that our illustrative calibration of the 6D model does a fairly good
job of matching the empirical covariances.
This analysis has shown that the empirical data is completely inconsistent with the standard
assumption of instantaneous adjustment. Lagged equity returns aﬀect consumption growth at
very long horizons: Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1) rises slowly with h, instead of quickly plateauing at
h =2 .T h i s s l o w r i s e i s a k e y t e s t o f t h e 6D framework.
We conclude from Figure 7 that the 6D model successfully predicts the proﬁle of Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+1)
for h =1 ,2,...,25. However, the 6D model fails to predict the proﬁle of a closely related object,











This h-period covariance generalizes the one-period Euler covariance, Cov(ln[Ct+1/Ct],lnRt+1).3536
The standard model with D =0predicts that the h-period normalized Euler covariance will
equal 2h−1
2h Θσ2 for all (integer) values of h. The factor 2h−1
2h captures time aggregation bias, which
becomes proportionately less important as the horizon increases. By contrast, the 6D model pre-
dicts that, if the D0s are uniformly distributed between 0 and D (e.g., D =3 0years or 120 quarters),
When the D



























This approximation turns out to be quite good for h ≥ 2.
35We thank Monika Piazzesi, whose insightful discussion of this paper at the NBER Macroeconomics Annual
Conference led us to add analysis of the covariance Euler equation to this ﬁnal draft.
36The “Euler covariances” link the equity premium to the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Consider the h-period

























where π is the 1-period equity premium.
24the h-period normalized Euler covariance should approximately37 equal h
4D
³




h<D. F o rb o t ht h es t a n d a r dm o d e l( D =0 )a n dt h e6D model, the normalized Euler covariance
should monotonically rise with h, but this rise should be much steeper for the standard model.
The empirical data matches neither prediction. In the twelve-country Campbell data, an initial
rise in the Euler covariance from h =1to h =7 , is subsequently reversed for larger values of h. For
h>20, the Euler covariances are very small in magnitude, with some negative point estimates.38
This result seems to contradict the encouraging results plotted in Figure 7. To understand this
















The h-period Euler covariance (i.e., left hand side) is zero for large h’s, and the ﬁrst sum in the
right hand side is positive (this is the object plotted in Figure 7). It follows that the second term




which can be veriﬁed in our sample.39 In words, lagged consumption growth negatively predicts
the current stock return. Such predictability explains why the Euler covariance does not follow














































38See Cochrane and Hansen (1992) for an early empirical analysis of the multi-period Euler equation. Daniel and
Marshall (1997, 1999) report that consumption Euler equations for aggregate data are not satisﬁed at the quarterly
frequency but improve at the two-year frequency. Our results are consistent with theirs, but we ﬁnd that this
relatively good performance deteriorates as the horizon is lengthened.





−4 for all of the countries in the Campbell dataset and
{−1.2,−2.4,−5.0,−3.0,−3.2}·10
−4 for the countries with large stock markets.
25the proﬁle predicted by the 6D model. Of course, this predictability is inconsistent with any
model in which the stock market follows a martingale. Alternative frameworks, like Campbell and
Cochrane’s (2000) model of habit formation, Barberis, Huang, and Santos’ (2001) Prospect Theory
model of asset pricing, or animal spirits models, are needed to explain why lagged consumption
growth negatively forecasts future stock returns.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Grossman and Laroque (1990) argue that adjustment costs might explain the equity premium
puzzle. Lynch (1996) and Marshall and Parekh (1999) have successfuly numerically simulated
discrete-time delayed adjustments models which conﬁrm Grossman and Laroque’s conjecture. We
have described a continuous-time generalization of Lynch’s (1996) model. We derive a complete
analytic characterization of the model’s dynamic properties. In addition, our continuous-time
framework generates eﬀects that are up to six times larger than those in discrete time models.
We analyze an economy composed of consumers who update their consumption every D periods.
Using data from our economy, an econometrician estimating the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
(CRRA) from the consumption Euler equation would generate a multiplicative CRRA bias of 6D.
Once we take account of this 6D bias, the Euler equation tests are unable to reject the standard
consumption model.
We have derived closed form expressions for the ﬁrst and second moments of this delayed adjust-
ment economy. The model matches most of the empirical moments of aggregate consumption and
equity returns, including a new test which conﬁrms the 6D prediction that the covariance between
ln(Ct+h/Ct) and Rt+1 should slowly rise with h. The 6D model fails long-horizon Euler equation
tests, but this failure is due to the interesting empirical regularity that high lagged consumption
growth predicts low future equity returns.
Future work should test the new empirical implications of our framework, including the rich
covariance lag structure that we have derived. Most importantly, our model implies that standard
Euler equation tests should be viewed very skeptically. Even small positive values of D (e.g.,
D =4quarters) dramatically bias the inferences that economists draw from Euler equations and
the related Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.
8 Appendix A: Proofs
We use approximations to get analytic results. Let ε ≡ max(r, ρ,θπ,σ2,σ2θ2,α). For annual data
ε ' .05. We shall use the notation f(ε)=O<t(εk),f o rk ∈ R, to mean that f is measurable with
respect to the information known at time t,a n dt h e r ei sε0 > 0 and a constant A>0 such that for
ε ≤ ε0A,w eh a v eE0[f2]1/2 ≤ A
¯ ¯εk¯ ¯. More concisely the norms are in the L2 sense. For instance:









We will often replace O<t(εk) by O
¡
εk¢
when there is a clear smallest time t such that f is
measurable with respect to the information known at time t. For instance we would say ert+σz(t) =
1+σz(t)+O(ε) to mean ert+σz(t) =1+σz(t)+O<t(ε).
26Also, we shall often use the function:
a(i) ≡ (1 − |i|)+. (33)







D − (i − j)+¢+ ,
¡
D0 − (j − i)+¢+´
(34)
as both are equal to the measure of [i − D,i] ∩ [j − D0,j].





t /(1 − γ)dt the expected value of the utils from consumption under the
optimal policy, assuming the ﬁrst reset date is t =0 .S ov(·) is the value function that applies at
reset dates. Say that the agent puts S in the checking account, and the rest, w−S, in the mutual
fund. Call M the (stochastic) value of the mutual fund at time D. By homotheticity, we have


















Optimizing over ct for t ∈ [0,D),w eg e tc
−γ
t = E [v0(w0)]e(r−ρ)(D−t),s ot h a tc o n s u m p t i o n
growth is that of the Ramsey model: ct = αwe
r−ρ
γ t for some α (by the implicit function theorem
one can show that it is a continuous function of D, and it has Merton’s value when D =0 ). To
avoid bankruptcy, we need S ≥ S0 =
R D
0 cte−rtdt. Imagine that the consumer starts by putting
aside the amount S0. Then, he has to manage optimally the remaining amount, w − S0.G i v e n





. But this is a ﬁnite horizon Merton problem with utility derived
from terminal wealth, whose solution is well-known: the whole amount w − S0 should be put in a




only the amount S0 is put in the checking account. ¤
8.2 Proof of Proposition 9
The basis of our calculations is the representation formula for consumption, Proposition 9. To
p r o v ei tw es h a l ln e e dt h ef o l l o w i n g
Lemma 10 We have
wit+s = wit(1 + θσ(z(t + s) − z(t)) + O(ε)). (36)
Proof. If the agent doesn’t check her portfolio between t and t + s,w eh a v e
wit+s = wite(r+θπ−θ2σ2/2)s+σθ(z(t+s)−z(t))
= wit (1 + σθ(z (t + s) − z (t)) + O(ε)). (37)









in the checking account, so that
wiτ+ = wiτ− (1 − f) (38)
= wiτ− (1 + O(ε)). (39)
Pasting together (37) and (39) at diﬀe r e n tt i m ei n t e r v a l sw es e et h a t( 3 7 )h o l d sb e t w e e nt w o
arbitrary dates (i.e., possibly including reset dates) t and t + s, and the lemma is proven.
We can now proceed to the
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . Say that i ∈ [0,D) has her latest reset point before t − 1 at
ti = t − 1 − i. The following reset points are ti + mD for m ≥ 1,a n df o rs ≥ t − 1 we have (the












witi(θσz[ti+(m−1)D,ti+mD] + O(ε))1s≥ti+mD + O(ε)
so that, using the notation ζim ≡ witiθσz[ti+(m−1)D,ti+mD],
Z T
ti







=( T − ti)witi +
X
m≥1
ζim (T − (ti + mD))
+ ,
and we get

























ζima(1 + i − mD)
because ti = t − 1 − i.
Let wt−D−1 = wi0,t−D−1, which implies that wi,t−D−1 = wt−D−1(1+O(ε)), for all i. Note that
i0 is an arbitrarily selected index value. We now get the expression for consumption growth








































8.3 Proof of Theorem 2































if D ≥ 1.
Using (1) and (6), this leads to the expression (2).
8.4 Proof of Theorem 3
First we need the
Lemma 11 We have, with d deﬁned in (11), for D ∈ R,
Z
R
a(i)a(i + D)di = d00(D).
P r o o fo ft h el e m m a11




a(i)a(i + D)di. (40)
First, note that g is even because a is. In addition, for D ≥ 2, g(D)=0 : for the integrand to
be non-zero in (40), we need both |i| < 1 and |i + D| < 1 , which is impossible for D ≥ 2.
29For a general D, we derive (in the sense of the theory of distributions, with Dirac’s δ function40)

















by direct calculation (or combinatorial insight) using a00(x)=δ(x+1)−2δ(x)+δ(x−1).W en o w



















where the bj are integration constants. But the condition g(D)=0for D ≥ 2 forces the bj’s to be
0, which concludes the proof.¤
T h er e s to ft h ep r o o fi si nt w os t e p s .F i r s tw ep r o v e( 4 1 ) - ( 4 2 ) ,t h e nw ec a l c u l a t et h i se x p r e s s i o n
of p(D,t).
Step 1.


































a(i)a(j)(D − |i − j − h|)
+ didj (42)
Step 2.
40Dirac’s δ function is equal to 0 everywhere except at 0, where δ(0) = ∞.
30Our next step is to calculate p(D,h). Start with the case D ≥ h+2:t h e n(D − |i − j − h|)
+ =









1,w eg e t




|i − j − h|a(i)a(j)didj.












a(i)(a(i + D − h)+a(i + D + h))di
because a is even and by an application of change in variables. So from Lemma 11 p00(D)=
d00(D − h)+d00(D + h) and
p(D,h)=d(D + h)+d(D − h)+d0 + d1D
for some real numbers d0,d 1. Equation (43) gives us d1 =0 ,s i n c ed0(x)=1 /2 for x>2. Finally,
p(0) = 0 gives A(h)=−d0 = d(h)+d(−h), which concludes the proof.
8.5 Proof of Corollary 4










for D ∈ [0,1].
Alternatively, this result can be obtained more directly from the calculation at the end of the proof
of Theorem 3.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Extend the argument used to prove Theorem 2. To calculate the correlation coeﬃcient, use the
variance results from Corollary 4.
8.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Because V (s1,s 2)=V (s1,1) − V (s2,1), it is enough to ﬁx s2 =1 . We use the notation s = s1.

















a(i)(i − max(i − D,s))
+ di. (44)
So, using the Heaviside function – H(x) ≡ 1 if x ≥ 0, 0 if x<0 (so that H0 = δ)–
W0 (s)=−
Z
a(i)H (i − max(i − D,s))H(s − i + D)di
= −
Z




a(i)(δ(i − s)H(s − i + D) − δ(s − i + D)H (i − s))di
= a(s) − a(s + D).
Introducing the e function deﬁn e di n( 1 5 ) ,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes e00 = a,w eg e t :
W (s)=e(s) − e(s + D)+W0 + W1s (45)
for some constants W0,W 1. Observe that for s ≥ 1,( 4 4 )g i v e sW(s)=0 ,s o( 4 5 )g i v e su sW1 =0
(and W0 = D/2). This allows to conclude the proposition.
8.8 Proof of Corollary 7
Immediate application of the preceding Theorem.
8.9 Proof of Theorem 8
The expression (23) is derived exactly like in Proposition 9. The only new work is to calculate









D − (i − j − h)+¢+ ,
¡
D0 − (j − i + h)+¢+´
didj.





D − (i − j − h)+¢+ −
¡
D0 − (j − i + h)+¢+´
H
¡







D − (i − j − h)+¢+ −
¡
D0 − (j − i + h)+¢+´
δ
¡






D − (i − j − h)+¢+ −
¡
D0 − (j − i + h)+¢+´
H
¡






a(i + D0 − h) − a
¡
i + D0 − D − h
¢¢
di.
32So Lemma 11 gives:
p = d(D0 − h) − d(D0 − D − h)+e0 + e1D0
where e0,e 1 are functions of D and h.A sp =0for D0 =0 ,w eg e te0 = −d(−h)+d(−D − h)=
−d(h)+d(D+h),a sd is even.As we should have p(D,D,h)=p(D,h) for p in (42), we can conclude
e1 =0and deduce the value of e0,s oT h e o r e m8i sp r o v e n .
8.10 Derivation of the utility losses
A fully rigorous derivation, e.g. of the type used by Rogers (2001), is possible here. Such a
derivation begins with the Bellman equation (35), and then uses a Taylor expansion to derive an
expression for v of the type v = v0+v1D+O
¡
v2¢
. This approach is tedious and not very instructive
about the economic orgins of the losses, which is why we present the following more heuristic proof.
Equation (28) is standard (e.g., see Cochrane 1989). For completeness’s sake, though, let us
mention a way to derive it. We want to calculate U(C)−U(C0), where C =( ct)t≥0 is the optimum




,a n dC0 is another vector that
can be bought with the same Arrow-Debreu prices p.F o rC and C0 close, we have
∆U ≡ U(C0) − U(C)
= U0(C)(C0 − C)+( C0 − C)0 · U00(C) · (C0 − C)/2+O((C0 − C)3).
As by optimality of C, U0(C)=λp for some p,a n dpC = pC0 = intial wealth = W,w eh a v e











A change ∆W in the initial wealth creates, by homotheticity of the optimal policy, a change in




















































This proves equation (28).
We now derive h∆c2
t/c2
ti,w i t h∆ct = c0






















































The cross term h(wτ − wt)(w0
τ − wτ)i =0 .
So we have the important (and general in these kinds of problems) fact that the ﬁrst order
contribution to the welfare loss is the direct impact of the delayed adjustment — the wτ −wt term
— whereas the indirect impact (where a suboptimal choice of consumption creates modiﬁcations in





ti| without modiﬁcation of the wealth process + O(ε2)






Using (28) we get (29).
9 Appendix B: Model with immediate adjustment in response to
large changes in equity prices
Suppose that people pay greater attention to “large” movements in the stock markets (because they
are more salient, or because it is more rational to do so). How does our bias change? We propose
the following tractable way to answer this question. Say that the returns in the stock market are:
dRt =( µ + r)dt + σdzt + djt
where jt is a jump process with arrival rate λ. For instance, such jumps may correspond to crashes,
or to “sharp corrections”, though we need not have E[djt] < 0.T ob es p e c i ﬁc, when a crash arrives
the return falls by J (to ﬁxi d e a s ,s a yJ = .1−.3). To model high attention to crashes, we say that
consumption adjusts to dzt shocks every D periods, and adjusts to dj shocks immediatly (D =0
for those Poisson events).
Call σ2
B the variance of Brownian shocks and σ2
J = E[dj 2
t ]/dt = λJ2 t h ev a r i a n c eo fj u m p
shocks. The total variance of the stock market is: σ2 = σ2
tot = σ2
B + σ2
J, assuming for simplicity
that the two types of shocks are independent. The equity premium is π = µ−λJ. By writing down
the standard value function for the Merton problem, one sees that the optimal equity share, θ, is




(1 − θJ)−γ − 1
¢
=0 .
34For tractability, we use the approximation J ¿ 1 (which is reasonable, since a typical value for J






plus higher order terms in J. One can show that formula (22), which was derived in the case of
assets with Brownian shocks, carries over to the case of a mix of Brownian shocks and jumps. Thus



















with b(0) = 2 and σ2
tot = σ2
B + σ2
J.T h u s ,t h en e wb i a si st h eh a r m o n i cm e a no ft h eb(D)=6 D (if
D ≥ 1) bias for “normal” Brownian shocks, and the shorter b(0) = 2 bias of the Brownian shocks.
As a numerical illustration, say a “jump” corresponds to a monthly change in the stock market
of more than J =25% in absolute value. This corresponds, empirically, to an estimate of λ =
.53%/year (5 months since 1925), i.e. a crash every 14 years. Then σ2
J/σ2
tot = λJ2/σ2 = .014.T a k e
D =4quarters as a baseline. The new b γ/γ becomes 20.6 which is close to the old ratio of 24.
10 Appendix C: Expression of the bias in the Lynch setup when
D ≥ 1.
In Lynch’s (1996) discrete-time setup, agents consume every month and adjust their portfolio
every T months. The econometric observation period is time-aggregated periods of F months, so
D = T/F.
Say consumer i ∈ {1,...,T} adjusts her consumption at i + nT, n ∈ Z. Say the econometrician














where rs =l nRs. Call CiF =
PF
s=1 cis the consumption of agent i in the period.
For i>F , cov(CiF,lnRF)=0because agent i did not adjust her consumption during the
period.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ F, cit =1 + O(ε) (normalizing) when t<i ,a n dcit =1 + θ
Pi
s=1 rs+O(ε) when t ≥ i,
where the O(ε) terms incorporate the deterministic part of consumption growth. The stochastic
part, in rs, has the order of magnitude σ = O(ε1/2), and dominates those terms. Information
about stock returns up to i will aﬀect only consumption from time i to F, so, calling ∆CiF the






























F (F +1 )
2
−
F (F +1 )( 2 F +1 )
6
¶
= θσ2F(F +1 ) (F +2 )
6T
.
But given that the mean per period consumption cit =1+O
¡
ε1/2¢
, the aggregate consumption is





= θσ2(F +1 ) ( F +2 )
6T
.
The naive econometrician would predict cov (∆CF/CF,lnRF)=θσ2F. The econometrician








(F +1 )( F +2 )
. (48)
Holding D constant, the continuous time limit corresponds to F →∞ ,a n dw eﬁnd the value: b γ/γ =
6D. The discrete time case where agents would consume at every econometric period corresponds
to F =1 , and then one gets b γ/γ = D, which can be easily derived directly.
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Figure 1: Ratio of estimated g to true g































For D>1 ratio is 6D  For D<1 ratio is
6g/[3(1-D)+D
2] 





















For |x| > 2 d(x)=|x|/2 
For |x| £ 2 see equation 11  
d(x) 





















G(D,0) » 1/D for large D 






































For h<1      
1/b(1/h)=h/6 
For h>1                         
1/b(1/h)=[3(1-1/h)+(1/h)
2]/6 






Figure 6: Normalized covariance of consumption growth and lagged asset returns,
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D = 2  


























Countries with large stock markets
2 




1Dataset is from Campbell (1999).  Full dataset includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.
2To identify countries with large stock markets, we ordered the countries by the ratio of stock
market capitalization to GDP (1993).  The top half of the countries were included in our large
stock market subsample: Switzerland (.87), United Kingdom (.80), USA (.72), Netherlands (.46),
Australia (.42), and Japan (.40).
3We assume that households have D values that are uniformly distributed from 0 years to 30 years.
 